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I. Introduction
Memories may be beautiful, and yet...
What's too painful to remember,
We simply choose to forget.'
In California, a jury convicted George Franklin of a previously un-
solved murder.2 Prosecutors relied heavily on the testimony of Franklin's
daughter.' In the daughter's account of the homicide, she described events
that she allegedly recalled after repressing memories of the murder for
nearly two decades.4 In Washington state, Paul Ingram confessed to the
Satanic ritual abuse of his two daughters.5 Before his daughters' allegations
of abuse, Ingram had no recollection of the abuse.6 Ingram later allegedly
remembered engaging in abusive acts that even his children did not allege.7
In California, Gary Ramona sued his daughter's therapists! Ramona as-
1. JOHNNY MATHIS, The Way We Were, on THE VERY BEST OF JOHNNY MATHIS
(Heartland Music 1992).
2. See LENoRE TERR, UNCHAINED MEMORIES 1-60 (1994) (describing George Franklin
trial); see also Victor Barall, Thanks for the Memories: Criminal Law and the Psychology
of Memory, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1473, 1487-95 (1994) (reviewing HARRY N. MACLEAN,
ONCE UPON A TIME: A TRUE STORY OF IEMORY, MURDER, AND THE LAW (1993) (describing
George Franklin trial)). See generally HARRY N. MACLEAN, ONCE UPON A TIME: A TRUE
STORY OF MEMORY, MURDER, AND THE LAW (1993) (describing George Franklin trial).
3. See generally MACLEAN, supra note 2 (discussing testimony of Eileen Franklin at
George Franklin's trial).
4. See generally id. (describing Eileen Franklin's repressed memories).
5. See generally LAWRENCE WRIGHT, REMEMBERING SATAN (1994) (describing Paul
Ingram case).
6. Id. at 6.
7. Id. at 186.
8. See Richard Cole, Suit Won Against 2 Therapists, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, May
15, 1994, at A3 (discussing Gary Ramona's suit against therapists accused of implanting false
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serted that the therapists had negligently implanted false memories of sexual
abuse into his child's mind.9 In a landmark decision,"0 a jury agreed and
awarded Ramona a substantial judgment. "
These cases all share a common element that lies at the heart of a
controversy that currently divides both the medical 2 and legal13 communi-
ties: recovered-memory therapy. 4 Although psychotherapists have used this
therapeutic technique for many years," recovered-memory therapy has
gained public recognition only in the past ten years.' 6 This awareness results
from high-profile trials, 7 a greater awareness of child abuse," and the
burgeoning "self-help" industry.' 9
memories).
9. See generally Katy Butler, Clashing Memories, Mixed Messages, L.A. TIMES, June
26, 1994, (Magazine), at 12 (discussing Ramona's claims against his daughter's therapists);
see also infra notes 30-57 and accompanying text (describing Gary Ramona case).
10. See Butler, supra note 9, at 12 (describing Ramona case as first time court has
permitted nonpatient to sue therapist for anything other than suicide or wrongful death).
11. See Jill Smolowe, Dubious Memories: A Father Accused of Sexual Abuse Wins a
Malpractice Judgment Against His Daughter's Therapists, TIME, May 23, 1994, at 51
(reporting that jury awarded Ramona $500,000 in damages).
12. See MICHAEL D. YAPKO, SUGGESTIONS OF ABUSE 27-29 (1994) (describing how
mental health profession is angrily and bitterly divided over phenomenon of repressed
memories of childhood sexual abuse); see also infra notes 67-84 and accompanying text
(outlining criticisms of recovered-memory therapy).
13. See Elizabeth F. Loftus & Laura A. Rosenwald, Buried Memories, Shattered Lives,
A.B.A. J., Nov. 1993, at 70, 70 (noting skepticism with which many judges and juries are
beginning to view some sex abuse claims based on recovered memories).
14. See infra notes 58-84 and accompanying text (describing recovered-memory therapy
and surrounding controversy).
15. See Richard Ofshe & Ethan Watters, Making Monsters: Recovered Memory Ther-
apy, SOCIETY, Mar./Apr. 1993, at 4, 5 (recognizing that mental health community has used
concept of repression in different ways for 100 years).
16. See YAPKO, supra note 12, at 16-17 (describing rapid increase in repressed child-
hood abuse inquiries during 1980s); see also Sarah Strickland, It Didn't Happen, But He
Remembered It: An American Professor Claims to Have Concrete Evidence that Memories
Can Be False, INDEPENDENT, Oct. 9, 1994, at 22 (noting that recovered-memory controversy
began to sweep United States in mid-1980s).
17. See supra notes 2-11 and accompanying text (outlining highly publicized cases of
George Franklin, Paul Ingram, and Gary Ramona).
18. See YAPKO, supra note 12, at 18-19 (noting how, upon recognition by mental health
profession that sexual abuse of children is not so uncommon, "floodgates" opened for reports
of childhood sexual abuse).
19. See id. at 137-42 (describing United States as nation that encourages individuals to
shirk responsibility for their problems, thus leading to America's rise as nation of "victims").
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Recovered-memory therapy has embroiled legal scholars in heated de-
bates over topics such as the tolling of statutes of limitations in cases involv-
ing recovered memories.' The landmark decision in Ramona v. Isabella,"
the first case in which a nonpatient successfully sued a psycho-therapist for
the negligent utilization of recovered-memory therapy,' shifted the focus
to the propriety of nonpatient suits against negligent recovered-memory
therapists.'
This Note examines the justification for extending psychotherapist lia-
bility beyond the traditional physician-patient relationship to include
compensating nonpatient family members injured by a psychotherapist's
negligent utilization of recovered-memory therapy.24 Part II.A discusses
Ramona itself.' Part II.B describes recovered-memory therapy and the
surrounding medical controversy. 6 Part III.A discusses the legal controversy
surrounding Ramona. Part IL.B examines how courts use policy, rather
than black-letter law, to decide whether to extend physician liability to
nonpatients. Part II.C argues that policy considerations warrant extending
psychotherapist liability to nonpatient family members in Ramona-type
cases.29
20. See generally Gary M. Ernsdorff & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Let Sleeping Memories
Lie? Words of Caution About Tolling the Statute of Limitations in Cases of Memory Repres-
sion, 84 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 129 (1993) (advocating caution in tolling statute of
limitations in repressed memory cases); Gary Strauss, Comment, Child Sexual Abuse Civil
Actions and the Statute of Limitations: Time is Running Out, 1993 DET. C.L. REV. 1641
(discussing balance between risk of stale claims and right to cause of action in debate over
statute of limitations).
21. Ramona v. Isabella, No. C61898 (Cal. Super. Ct. Napa County May 13, 1994).
22. See Sherrie F. Nachman, A Victoryfora Victim of "False Memories," AM. LAW.,
July/Aug. 1994, at 33 (portraying Ramona v. Isabella as first successful verdict against prac-
titioners of recovered-memory therapy).
23. See infra notes 201-87 and accompanying text (discussing propriety of Ramona-type
suits).
24. Cf. ROBERT I. SIMON & ROBERT L. SADOFF, PSYCHIATRIC MALPRACTICE: CASES
AND COMMENTS FOR CLINICIANS 28 (1992) (noting traditional common-law requirement of
physician-patient relationship).
25. See infra notes 30-57 and accompanying text (discussing Ramona).
26. See infra notes 58-84 and accompanying text (describing recovered-memory therapy
and surrounding medical controversy).
27. See infra notes 85-92 and accompanying text (discussing legal controversy sur-
rounding Ramona).
28. See infra notes 93-200 and accompanying text (examining how courts consider
policy factors when faced with expanding physician liability).
29. See infra notes 201-87 and accompanying text (arguing that policy considerations
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II. Recovered-Memory Therapy: A Controversial Treatment
A. Ramona v. Isabella
In early 1990, Gary Ramona embodied the American dream. He had
a beautiful wife and three loving daughters.' As sales and marketing vice
president31 for the Robert Mondavi winery,32 Ramona earned $500,000 annu-
ally and was building a $3 million dream house.33 But, on March 15,
Ramona's life began to fall apart.' On that day, Ramona's daughter, Holly,
in the company of her mother, Stephanie Ramona, and her therapist,
Dr. Marche Isabella, accused Gary of sexual abuse." Holly claimed that she
had recovered memories of this abuse with Isabella's assistance.36 In the
years that followed, Ramona's wife divorced him, his daughters refused to
see him, and the Robert Mondavi winery fired him.37
Holly did not remember any abuse before the fall of 1989."8 At that
time, Holly began receiving therapy from Isabella for depression and
bulimia.39 Isabella, who suggested a link between bulimia and sexual abuse,
asked codefendant Richard Rose to give Holly a dose of sodium amytal and
support extending psychotherapist liability to nonpatient family members in Ramona-type
cases).
30. See Butler, supra note 9, at 12 (describing Ramona's life before accusations arose).
31. See id. (same).
32. The Ramona case is, perhaps, better-known as "the Mondavi wine trial," regardless
of the winery's relatively minor connection to the trial. See Victoria Slind-Flor, On Trial:
He Says "Recovered' Memories Ruined Him, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 18, 1994, at A10 (depicting
winery's tenuous, but well-known, connection to Ramona).
33. See Butler, supra note 9, at 12 (describing Gary Ramona's life before case).
34. See id. (discussing result of daughter's accusations).
35. See id. at 36 (describing conflicting views of confrontation on March 15, 1990).
36. See id. (discussing Holly's claims of recovered memories).
37. See id. at 12 (discussing results of accusations for Gary Ramona). The Mondavi
winery denied that they based Ramona's discharge from the company on the charges of sexual
abuse. See Slind-Flor, supra note 32, at AlO (discussing Mondavi winery's explanation of
Ramona's departure). Instead, they claim that they fired Ramona because he "represented
a style of management that could not accommodate to the changing of the guard when Tim
and Michael Mondavi took over the reins of the winery from patriarch Robert Mondavi."
See id. (explaining conflict of management style).
38. See Butler, supra note 9, at 12 (discussing Holly's lack of memory of any abuse).
39. See id. (describing Holly's treatment beginning in fall of 1989); see also YAPKO,
supra note 12, at 20 (1994) (describing recovered-memory therapists' tendency to use check-
lists of'symptoms of sexual abuse).
40. See People v. Bynum, 556 P.2d 469, 470 (Colo. 1976) (explaining use of sodium
amytal). "Sodium amytal is popularly misnomered as a 'truth serum,' and.., the drug acts
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began utilizing recovered-memory therapy.4 As a result of this treatment,
Isabella claimed that Holly uncovered previously buried memories of sexual
abuse by her father.42 Holly and Isabella continued the treatment until Holly
confronted her father in March 1990.' 3 One year later, Gary Ramona filed
suit against Isabella, Dr. Richard Rose (the hospital's administrator), and the
hospital where Holly received treatment. 44 Ramona alleged that the doctors
had implanted false memories of sexual abuse into his daughter's mind.4'
The court's willingness even to allow Ramona to maintain the suit was
ground-breaking. In most cases, courts only permit nonpatients to sue
physicians for injuries resulting from the patient's subsequent conduct, not
from the physician's treatment itself.47 Ramona v. Isabella was also the first
case that put the validity of recovered-memory therapy itself on trial. '  Even
more amazing was the suit's outcome - a Napa Valley jury awarded Gary
Ramona $500,000 in damages. 49 Although the jury's decision was vague, 5'
the implication was clear: Psychotherapists who use recovered-memory ther-
apy owe, at least in some instances, a duty of care to nonpatients.
as a depressant which is sometimes used as a diagnostic tool by psychiatrists to reduce a
patient's inhibitions so that his subconscious impressions might be more deeply probed." Id.
41. See Butler, supra note 9, at 34 (discussing Isabella's use of sodium amytal in
recovered-memory therapy).
42. See id. (discussing Isabella's recollection of results of treatment).
43. See id. (describing Holly's confrontation of her father).
44. See id. at 12 (noting Gary Ramona's suit against Marche Isabella, Dr. Richard
Rose, and Western Medical Center of Anaheim).
45. See id. at 34 (recognizing Ramona's allegation that Isabella had "suggested sexual
abuse" to his daughter).
46. Cf. Christina Bannon, Comment, Recovered Memories of Childhood Sexual Abuse:
Should the Courts Get Involved When Mental Health Professionals Disagree?, 26 ARiz. ST.
L.J. 835, 850 (1994) (stating that Ramona could open door for more nonpatient lawsuits).
47. See Butler, supra note 9, at 12 (recognizing Ramona as first time court has allowed
nonpatient to sue for something other than suicide or wrongful death).
48. See B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Father Who Fought 'Memory Therapy' Wins Damage
Suit, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1994, § 1, at 1 (referring to Ramona as first case in which
nonpatient challenged therapists who treat patients with recovered-memory therapy).
49. See Smolowe, supra note 11, at 51 (noting 10-to-2 vote and jury award of
$500,000).
50. See Butler, supra note 9, at 12 (characterizing jury verdict and award of only
$475,000 of $8 million sought as "complex" and "ambiguous"). However, statements from'
jury members have made it clear that they did not believe that the therapists were malicious
in their actions. See Smolowe, supra note 11, at 51 (quoting jury foreman Thomas Dudum
as saying: "We felt there was nothing done [by the therapists] that was malicious").
51. See Smolowe, supra note 11, at 51 (stating fact that jurors held therapists negli-
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The responses to nonpatient suits against therapists understandably have
been diverse. On one side are those who criticize extensions of physician
liability like Ramona because they believe that such verdicts will stymie
much-needed medical research into new therapeutic techniques,' that individ-
uals will be unable to receive much-needed treatment,53 and that the decisions
impermissibly ignore the traditional requirement that a physician-patient
relationship exist before liability can attach.' In the opposite camp, the
wrongfully accused and therapists wary of recovered-memory therapy have
praised Ramona for its recognition of the enormous risks55 that this allegedly
uncertain method of treatment creates.5
Recovered-memory therapy lies at the heart of this matter. The tech-
nique has divided mental health professionals, which has made it difficult to
justify either the imposition of, or the immunization from, liability.'
B. Recovered-Memory Therapy and the Underlying Medical Controversy
Recovered-memory therapy, as the name implies, is a technique psycho-
therapists utilize to help patients recover memories that they, for one reason
or another, have repressed as a defense mechanism.58 Full understanding of
the controversy surrounding this therapy and the propriety of imposing liabil-
ity on negligent psychotherapists requires an understanding of the methodol-
ogy employed by recovered-memory therapists.
While techniques vary among therapists, recovered-memory therapy
almost always arises in the same way. A patient seeks treatment from the
gent).
52. See TARKY LOMBARDI, JR. WITH GERALD N. HOFFMAN, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
INsURANC E: A LEGISLATOR'S VIEw 23-24 (1978) (stating claim of many doctors that threat
of malpractice suits limits medical research).
53. See Cole, supra note 8, at A3 (noting concern that Ramona verdict will make thera-
pists overly cautious in treating patients).
54. See infra notes 85-86 and accompanying text (outlining traditional medical malprac-
tice rule requiring physician-patient relationship to maintain action).
55. See Tom Philp, Recovered-Memory Debate: Quackery or Crime Solver?, SACRA-
MENTO BEE, July 24, 1994, at Al, A21 (quoting mental health expert as stating that recov-
ered-memory therapy makes lobotomy look like trivial error by comparison).
56. See Barall, supra note 2, at 1479 (pointing out that modern psychologists are neither
as skeptical as Freud nor uncritically accepting of reliability of recovered memories).
57. See YAPKO, supra note 12, at 27-29 (describing how recovered-memory therapy
divides the mental health profession).
58. See Ayres, supra note 48, at 1 (stating that goal of recovered-memory therapy is
to "prod patients into recalling events that were so traumatic that their minds repressed
them").
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therapist, perhaps for a problem that the patient believes to be unrelated to
sexual abuse.59 Most therapists have a checklist of symptoms that indicate
past sexual abuse and will compare the list with the patient's complaints 0
If the patient exhibits some or all of the telltale symptoms of childhood sexual
abuse, the therapist probably will confront the patient directly and ask the
patient about past sexual abuse.6' If the patient denies being molested, the
therapist then will attempt to have the patient recover memories of any abuse
that may have occurred.62
The psychotherapist has many tools to aid the patient's recovery of these
memories, including drugs, 63 hypnosis, guided fantasy, automatic writing,
strategic use of support groups, suggestion, interpersonal pressure, and ap-
peal to authority.' 4 Patients often are very susceptible to these techniques,
and it is possible for the therapist to implant false memories into the patient's
mind.' Proponents of recovered-memory therapy claim that, after extensive
therapy, the patient can recall instances of abuse long buried in the recesses
of the mind.' Critics of this technique, however, emphasize the suggestibil-
ity of a patient who is seeking to uncover the causes of his or her emotional
problems.67 These detractors also allege that many proponents of recov-
ered-memory therapy misunderstand the way that memory actually works,
which the critics claim further flaws this method. 8
59. See Butler, supra note 9, at 12 (noting that Holly Ramona did not seek treatment for
sexual abuse). For example, Holly Ramona initially sought treatment for depression and buli-
mia. See id. (discussing Holly's treatment).
60. See YAPKO, supra note 12, at 107 (describing how some therapists use checklists in
making diagnoses).
61. See id. at 20 (noting that patients are sometimes told that their symptoms suggest
childhood abuse).
62. See Ofshe & Watters, supra note 15, at 4 (discussing therapist's attempts to recover
any memories of abuse).
63. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (describing how psychotherapists use
sodium amytal).
64. See Ofshe & Watters, supra note 15, at 7 (discussing techniques that recovered-
memory therapists employ). "Automatic writing" refers to the hypnotic technique whereby "the
patient engages in writing her unconscious thoughts while performing some other activity.'
Jacqueline Kanovitz, Hypnotic Memories and Civil Sexual Abuse Trials, 45 VAND. L. REv.
1185, 1262 (1992) (discussing use and recognizing risk of hypnosis).
65. See Loftus & Rosenwald, supra note 13, at 70 (relating some researchers' claims that
therapists inadvertently may plant false memories through suggestive questioning).
66. See TnnR, supra note 2, at 40-41 (claiming that victim can recall traumatic childhood
experiences in adulthood without much blurring).
67. See YAPKO, supra note 12, at 92-111 (outlining phenomenon of human suggestibility).
68. See id. at 69-81 (outlining how memory does, and does not, work).
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Critics of the technique say that the validity of recovered-memory ther-
apy largely relies on an outdated conception of how memory works.69 Previ-
ously, the mental health profession believed that memory worked much like
a tape recorder: The mind stores all events and their surrounding details, and
an individual can review these events and details with complete accuracy by
merely pressing the mental "Play" button.70
However, scientists now believe that memory works more like a file
cabinet.7 When an individual experiences an event, the mind divides the
occurrences into tiny bits.' Next, the mind parcels these fragments to vari-
ous areas of the brain, much like a filing system. 3 Finally, the brain "tags"
the pieces so that these pieces will remain linked together.74 When the indi-
vidual tries to remember the event, the mind must reassemble the bits and
pieces to form a coherent memory.75 This job belongs to the limbic system
of the brain.76
The difference between the filing system theory and the tape recorder
model is that the filing system theory recognizes that the mind can take many
accurate, but unrelated, pieces of memories and put them together, a process
that may result in a false memory.77 For example, consider a witness to a
car accident who claims (and honestly believes) that the defendant driver ran
a red light.' Quite possibly, the witness's mind took actual memories of the
accident and put them together with other actual, though unconnected, memo-
ries of cars failing to heed traffic signals.79
The implications of the "filing cabinet" conception of memory are
enormous.' An already impressionable patient can take actual memories,
69. See Ofshe & Watters, supra note 15, at 4, 5-7 (claiming that scientific studies have
shown recovered-memory therapists' understanding of how memory works to be incorrect).
70. See id. at 5-6 (noting that basis of recovered-memory therapy emerges from belief
that human mind records and stores everything perceived).
71. See Sharon Begley with Martha Brant, You Must Remember This, NEWSWEEK, Sept.
26, 1994, at 68 (describing how memory is thought to work).
72. See id. (describing experience as "bits and pieces").
73. See id. (describing parceling out of pieces into different areas of brain, such as the
visual and auditory cortexes).
74. See id. (discussing role of limbic system in gathering pieces into cohesive whole).
75. See id. (same).
76. See id.
77. See id. (recognizing inevitability that "people will 'remember' things that never
happened").
78. Cf. id. (illustrating possibility of "false memory").
79. Cf. id. (describing incorrect assembly of memory pieces into "false memory").
80. See YAPKo, supra note 12, at 92-111 (discussing phenomenon of human suggest-
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such as being hugged as a young child by her father and, at the suggestion
of a negligent psychotherapist, connect them with other actual memories,
such as an early traumatic experience, to "recall" instances of sexual abuse
that never occurred."1 Thus, an overzealous therapist can further complicate
the already tenuous system of memory recall.
Because of the danger of memory implantation, recovered-memory
therapists must take caution in their treatment, especially given the devastat-
ing injuries that may result. 2 Though proponents of the technique claim that
critics overstate the danger, 3 even some recovered-memory therapists admit
that some risk does exist.84
III. Should Courts Extend Psychotherapist Liability to Nonpatient Family
Members Injured by Negligent Recovered-Memory Therapy?
A. Why is Ramona Legally "Groundbreaking"?:
A Precedential Explanation
Generally, a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action must prove the
existence of a physician-patient relationship 5 between the physician and the
allegedly injured party." Although some courts have permitted nonpatient
ibility).
81. See Slind-Flor, supra note 32, at AlO (describing how, in Ramona, plaintiff's
counsel argued that Holly Ramona's alleged memories of sexual abuse were misplaced
recollections of unanesthetized cystoscopic examination performed when she suffered chronic
bladder infections at young age).
82. See Philp, supra note 55, at A21 (quoting mental health expert as stating that
recovered-memory therapy makes lobotomy look like trivial error by comparison).
83. See TERR, supra note 2, at 40-41 (claiming that firsthand, traumatic memory does
not appear to undergo much weakening or blurring over time).
84. See Mark Bowden, Repressed-Memory Syndrome Splits Psychiatrists, PHILADEL-
PHIA INQUIRER, May 23, 1994, at B2 (describing recovered-memory therapy advocate's
alleged admission that some recovered memories are false).
85. See Neil J. Squillante, Comment, Expanding the Potential Tort Liability of Physi-
cians: A Legal Portrait of "Nontraditional Patients" and Proposals for Change, 40 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 1617, 1632 (1993) (defining traditional physician-patient relationship). "The
hallmarks of a 'traditional' [physician-patient] relationship are: (1) affirmative treatment of
an individual; or (2) a benefit bestowed upon the individual, such as medical advice." Id.
86. See Weaver v. University of Mich. Bd. of Regents, 506 N.W.2d 264, 266 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1993) (noting that physician-patient relationship is necessary in order to maintain
medical malpractice action); Gallion v. Woytassek, 504 N.W.2d 76, 79 (Neb. 1993) (recog-
nizing that physician's duty to exercise required skill or standard of care must arise out of
physician-patient relationship); Heller v. Peekskill Community Hosp., 603 N.Y.S.2d 548,
549 (App. Div. 1993) (noting that physician-patient relationship is necessary in order to
maintain medical malpractice action).
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suits against doctors, these rare cases generally have involved a nonpatient
who seeks reparation for injuries resulting from the conduct of the doctor's
patient, not the physician's conduct.' For example, courts have held health
care providers liable to nonpatients in cases in which a physician who knew
or should have known of his patient's intent to harm a nonpatient failed to
warn the subsequently injured nonpatient.88 Courts also have held doctors
accountable to injured nonpatients for failing to instruct patients about the
side-effects of certain drug treatments before driving,89 for failing to warn
identifiable nonpatients about the contagious nature of the patients' diseases,'
and for releasing mentally disturbed patients.91
The history of the physician-patient relationship requirement and the
unwillingness of courts to allow nonpatient suits for injuries caused directly
by a doctor's conduct jointly illuminate why Ramona, though only a trial
court decision, incited such a furor in the legal and medical communities.
Ramona not only permitted a nonpatient suit against a psychotherapist, but
also allowed recovery for nonpatient injuries caused by a mental health
professional's treatment of a patient.' Thus, if Ramona signals a new
87. See infra notes 88-92 and accompanying text (discussing exceptions to physi-
cian-patient relationship requirement).
88. See Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 353 (Cal. 1976) (finding
that therapist failed to exercise reasonable care to protect nonpatient from psychiatric patient).
89. See Gooden v. Tips, 651 S.W.2d 364, 370 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that
nonpatients injured in car accident by patient stated cause of action against physician who
allegedly prescribed drug to patient and failed to warn patient about drug's intoxicating
effect). "[i]t is apparent that, under proper facts, a physician can owe a duty to use reason-
able care to protect the driving public where the physician's negligence in diagnosis or
treatment of his patient contributes to plaintiff's injuries." Id. at 369.
90. See Bradshaw v. Daniel, 854 S.W.2d 865, 872 (Tenn. 1993) (holding that physician
owed nonpatient duty to warn about contagious nature of disease). "We, therefore, conclude
that the existence of the physician-patient relationship is sufficient to impose upon a physician
an affirmative duty to warn identifiable third persons in the patient's immediate family against
foreseeable risks emanating from a patient's illness." Id.
91. See Wofford v. Eastern State Hosp., 795 P.2d 516, 520 (Okla. 1990) (holding that
psychiatrist has duty to exercise reasonable professional care in discharge of mental patient).
In Wofford, the court stated:
[A] psychiatrist has a duty to exercise reasonable professional care in the dis-
charge of a mental patient ... [w]hen in accordance with the standards of his
profession the therapist knows or should know that his patient's dangerous propen-
sities present an unreasonable risk of harm to others. The duty extends to such
persons as are foreseeably endangered by the patient's release.
Id.
92. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (noting that Ramona received substantial
verdict against psychotherapist who had treated Ramona's daughter).
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extension of physician liability to nonpatients, then the case warrants an
examination of the justifications for broadening doctors' legal duties.
B. Important Factors in Imposing Tort Liability
A medical malpractice suit is essentially a tort action against a physician
for negligence. 93 Thus, for a plaintiff to successfully maintain a malpractice
cause of action, the plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence,94 the four traditional elements of a negligence suit:95 (1) a duty
owed by the doctor to the plaintiff,96 (2) a breach of that duty by the physi-
cian,' (3) injury to the plaintiff,98 and (4) a causal relationship between the
doctor's breach and the plaintiff's injury. 99 Together, the first two elements
constitute the alleged negligence of the physician."
93. See Welke v. Kuzilla, 375 N.W.2d 403, 406 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (recognizing
that medical malpractice action is essentially tort claim of negligence).
94. See Palmer v. Biloxi Regional Medical Ctr., Inc., 564 So. 2d 1346, 1354 (Miss.
1990) (acknowledging that recovery by plaintiff in negligence action requires proof by
preponderance of evidence of conventional tort elements).
95. See Caughell v. Group Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 876 P.2d 898, 906 (Wash.
1994) (listing duty, breach, proximate cause, and injury as four traditional elements of
negligence).
96. See infra notes 201-87 and accompanying text (discussing justifications for imposing
on recovered-memory therapists duty of care to nonpatient family members in Ramona-type
cases).
97. See Snyder v. Cobb, 638 N.E.2d 442, 445 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (listing standard
of care with which physician must comply). "A physician treating a patient is required to
possess and exercise that degree of skill and care ordinarily possessed and exercised by a
reasonably careful, skillful and prudent practitioner in the same class to which he belongs
treating such maladies under the same or similar circumstances." Id. This Note does not
describe how a recovered-memory therapist could fall below the above-described standard.
For an example of how a psychotherapist could be negligent in utilizing recovered-memory
therapy, see Kanovitz, supra note 64, at 1187-90 (describing therapy involving suggestive
questioning).
98. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7 (1965) (defining "injury"). Injury is
"the invasion of any legally protected interest of another." Id. For a description of the
injuries caused by negligent recovered-memory therapy, see infra notes 241-47 and accompa-
nying text (describing nonpatient injuries caused by negligent recovered-memory therapy).
99. See Richard R. Orsinger, Asserting Claims for Intentionally or Recklessly Causing
Severe Emotional Distress in Connection with Divorce, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1253, 1282
(1994) (defining "proximate cause"). Proximate cause is "that cause which, in a natural and
continuous sequence, produces an event, and without which cause such event would not have
occurred." Id.
100. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 30,
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The key issue is whether a duty of care to the plaintiff exists. 01 Courts
define a legal duty as nothing more than a decision that, based upon relevant
considerations of public policy,"° a plaintiff deserves judicial protection.' 3
Public policy concerns are most visible - and most controversial - when
a court overrules an established precedent."° In any event, policy forms the
basis for imposing tort liability on individuals."
Many factors underlie public policy, and various commentators have
given different accounts of the elements that courts do - or should -
consider.'0 5 For example, two prominent torts scholars have suggested that
courts impose a duty based upon the need for compensation in a particular
case, 'I the historical development of the proposed duty,108 the moral aspect
of the defendant's conduct,"° the convenience of administration, 110 the
capacity of the defendant to bear or distribute the loss,"' and the prevention
of and pun-ishment for the conduct that caused the plaintiff's injuries."' On
the other hand, the Restatement (Second) of Torts simply states that courts
should weigh the magnitude of the risk of injury against the utility of the
conduct."I3
at 164 (5th ed. 1984) (stating that duty and breach constitute negligence).
101. See infra notes 201-87 and accompanying text (arguing that courts should impose
duty of care to nonpatient family members on recovered-memory therapists).
102. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 100, § 3, at 15 (claiming that torts is battleground
of social theory).
103. See Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976) (defining
legal duties as "conclusory expressions that, in cases of a particular type, liability should be
imposed for damage done").
104. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 100, § 3, at 15 (discussing influence of public
policy on tort law when overruling established precedent).
105. See infra notes 117-200 and accompanying text (demonstrating how courts weigh
policy factors to determine whether to impose duties).
106. See infra notes 107-13 and accompanying text (discussing factors addressed in
determining imposition of tort duty).
107. See KEErON Er AL., supra note 100, § 4, at 20 (recognizing need for compensation
as "a powerful factor influencing tort law").
108. See id. at 20-21 (noting influence of precedent, as well as influences of social, eco-
nomic, and political forces at time of these decisions).
109. See id. at 21-23 (discussing moral guilt or blame attached to defendant's actions).
110. See id. at 23-24 (recognizing limitations on ability to remedy all wrongs).
111. See id. at 24-25 (noting court's examination of ability of different parties to bear
loss).
112. See id. at 25-26 (discussing court's desire to prevent future harm and to punish
offender).
113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 291 (1965).
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Courts that have considered extending physician liability to nonpatients
also have weighed policy concerns.11 4 Indeed, courts expanding doctor ac-
countability beyond the traditional physician-patient relationship have can-
didly acknowledged their methodology." 5 Although Ramona is the first case
of its kind, a perusal of other physician-nonpatient case precedent is instruc-
tive on the types of policy considerations that factor into the judicial extension
of liability."16
1. Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California:
A Methodological Point of Departure
One particularly illuminating example is Tarasoff v. Regents of Univer-
sity of California."7 Tarasoff, a controversial decision,"' represented a
marked departure from precedent that based physician liability on a physi-
cian-patient relationship" 9 and, according to one commentator, signaled a
new era in tort law.120 In Tarasoff , the California Supreme Court imposed
an obligation on physicians to notify nonpatients of impending danger from
the doctors' patients. 21  A brief examination of Tarasoff demonstrates that
114. See infra notes 117-200 and accompanying text (examining policy factors courts
consider to determine whether to impose duties).
115. See infra notes 117-200 and accompanying text (outlining how courts openly weigh
policy factors).
116. See infra notes 117-200 and accompanying text (examining physician-nonpatient
case law).
117. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
118. See Chris M. Kallianos, Psychiatrists' Liability to Third Parties for Harmful Acts
Committed by Dangerous Patients, Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1985, 64
N.C. L. REV. 1534, 1541 (1986) (describing Tarasoff as controversial decision); Vanessa
Merton, Confidentiality and the "Dangerous" Patient: Implications of Tarasofffor Psychia-
trists and Lawyers, 31 EMoRY L.J. 263, 275 (1982) (referring to Tarasoff as controversial and
unprecedented); Walter E. Johnson, Note, Tort Liability in Georgia for the Criminal Acts of
Another, 18 GA. L. REv. 361, 361 (1984) (describing Tarasoff as controversial). But see
D.L. Rosenhan et al., Warning Third Parties: The Ripple Effects of Tarasoff, 24 PAc. L.J.
1165, 1224 (1993) (stating that Tarasoff may be considered legal embodiment of many
therapists' ethical convictions).
119. See Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 353 (Cal. 1976) (allowing
nonpatient to state cause of action against therapists for failure to warn).
120. See Peter F. Lake, Revisiting Tarasoff, 58 ALB. L. REV. 97, 98 (1994) (claiming
that courts have used Tarasoff to reconceptualize nature and source of duty and tort liability).
"[Tarasoff] is more than just a 'policy' case .... Instead, Tarasoff is the Palsgraf of its
generation, a case with meta-significance which endures beyond its jurisdiction, time, place,
and perhaps its particular holding." Id. (footnote omitted).
121. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 353.
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the California Supreme Court's decision provides a workable methodology
under which to examine the extension of physician liability to nonpatient
family members for the negligent utilization of recovered-memory therapy.
Prosenjit Poddar was a patient of Dr. Lawrence Moore, a psychologist
employed by the University of California." During a treatment session,
Poddar confided to Moore that Poddar intended to kill Tatiana Tarasoff. '
Moore informed campus police of Poddar's disclosure, but officers only
briefly detained, then released, Poddar because he appeared "rational."'24
Moore, at least in part because of commands from his superiors, took no
further action with regard to Poddar's threat."z Two months after his initial
admission, Poddar killed Tarasoff.'26
Tarasoff's parents brought suit against Moore and several others 27 and
claimed that the defendants had breached a duty to warn Tarasoff of Poddar's
plan."m The defendants claimed that they did not owe a duty to Tarasoff in
the absence of a physician-patient relationship. 29 The California Supreme
Court ruled that the therapists did owe Tarasoff a duty of reasonable care,
despite the absence of a therapeutic association.'
In determining that the therapists owed a legal obligation to Tarasoff,
the court acknowledged that courts impose duties to serve public policy.'
122. Id. at 339.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 339-40.
125. Id. at 340. Tarasoff's parents, the plaintiffs in Tarasoff, claimed that Dr. Moore's
superior, Dr. Harvey Powelson, the chief of the department of psychiatry at Dr. Moore's
hospital, directed the staff to take no further action to confine Poddar. Id. at 340 & n.2.
126. Id. at 339.
127. Id. at 340 n.2. Besides Dr. Moore, the Tarasoffs brought suit against Dr. Moore's
superior, two of Dr. Moore's colleagues - psychiatrists at the same hospital, who concurred
in Moore's decision that the staff should commit Poddar - and various police officers. Id.
As used henceforth, "defendants" will refer to the therapists and not the police officers.
128. Id. at 340. The Tarasoffs' complaint also based liability on the defendants' failure
to confine Poddar pursuant to a statute. Id. As to that second ground, the California
Supreme Court concluded that the defendants enjoyed the protection of statutory immunity.
Id. at 351-53.
129. Id. at 340. Defendants also claimed that they enjoyed statutory immunity. Id. The
court found that immunity protected the defendants for their failure to confine Poddar. Id.
at 351-53. However, the Tarasoff court ruled that the defendant therapists did not enjoy
immunity from liability for the therapists' failure to warn Tarasoff. Id. at 349-51.
130. Id. at 353.
131. Id. at 342. The Tarasoff court noted that duty "is not sacrosanct in itself, but only
an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that
the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection." Id. (quoting Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912,
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The Tarasoff court stated that courts presume a duty of care whenever two
parties are so situated that one person would injure another person if the
former did not use reasonable care.13 The court noted that the defendant may
rebut this presumption only by a "balancing of a number of consider-
ations. 133 The court recognized "foreseeability" as chief among those fac-
tors. '14
A reader of Tarasoff naturally would expect the California Supreme
Court to determine first whether the presumption of a duty of care applied
to the therapists.1 Then, if the court did presume that the therapists had a
duty to Tarasoff, one would assume that the court would balance pertinent
policy considerations to decide if these factors rebutted the presumption and
thus did not justify imposing a duty on the therapists and similarly-situated
psychologists. 136 However, the Tarasoff court failed to continue in such an
organized fashion. After setting forth a relatively coherent and flexible ana-
lytic structure, the California Supreme Court instead relied on a technical rule
from the Restatement (Second) of Torts.37 The court recognized that individ-
uals generally have no duty to control the conduct of others."3 However,
916 (Cal. 1968) (quoting WILLIAM L. PROssER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 332-33
(3d ed. 1964))).
132. Id. The California Supreme Court acknowledged that "whenever one person is by
circumstances placed in such a position with regard to another... that if he did not use
ordinary care and skill in his own conduct... he would cause danger of injury to the person
or property of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such danger."
Id. (quoting Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968) (quoting Heaven v.
Pender, 11 Q.B.D. 503, 509 (1883))).
133. Id.
134. Id. The court identified the general principle that a "defendant owes a duty of care
to all persons who are foreseeably endangered by his conduct, with respect to all risks which
make the conduct unreasonably dangerous." Id. (quoting Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 525 P.2d 669, 680 (Cal. 1975)).
135. See supra note 132 and accompanying text (describing when presumption of duty
arises).
136. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (noting that balancing of policy consider-
ations can rebut presumption of duty).
137. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 343 (Cal. 1976) (citing
RPSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965)). According to the American Law Institute,
[t]here is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him
from causing physical harm to another unless (a) a special relation exists between
the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the
third person's conduct, or (b) a special relation exists between the actor and the
other which gives to the other a right to protection.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965).
138. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 343.
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the California court also noted that courts have created an exception to this
rule when the defendant has a special relationship with the person whose
actions need to be controlled or with the foreseeable victim of those ac-
tions."I Under this rule, the Tarasoff court held that Moore had a duty of
care because of his special relationship with Poddar.'40 The court then con-
sidered policy only as a justificatory afterthought.' 4'
Notwithstanding the court's disappointing treatment of policy consider-
ations, Tarasoff's policy discussion is representative of the types of policy
factors that courts consider before extending physician liability.142 The Tara-
soff court enumerated the "major" policy factors that a court should consider:
[1] the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, [2] the degree of certainty that
the plaintiff suffered injury, [3] the closeness of the connection between the
defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, [4] the moral blame attached
to the defendant's conduct, [5] the policy of preventing future harm, [6] the
extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community
of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and
[7] the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. 43
The court labeled foreseeability as the most important factor.'" Although
foreseeability was important to the court, the policy section of the opinion
dealt mainly with two other factors - the prevention of future harm"45 and the
consequences to the defendant and society in extending physician liability.'"
139. Id. The Tarasoff court noted that a relationship between the defendants and either
Poddar or Tarasoff would establish a duty of care because "a duty of care may arise from
either '(a) a special relation... between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty
upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or (b) a special relation.., between the
actor and the other which gives to the other a right of protection.'" Id. (quoting RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965)).
140. Id. The court stated that, while similar California cases required that the defendant
be in a special relationship with both the victim and the dangerous party for an affirmative
duty for the benefit of a third person to arise, it did not think that such duties should be
constrained to such situations. Id. at 344.
141. See id. at 344-48 (dealing with policy objections of defendants and amicus curiae).
142. See infra notes 169-200 (describing policy factors that courts consider when
determining whether to impose duty).
143. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976) (quoting
Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968)).
144. Id.
145. See id. at 346-48 (arguing that imposing duty of care on therapists who know or
should know that their patients pose serious danger of violence to others furthers public
interest of protecting potential victims).
146. See id. at 344-48 (dealing with arguments that imposing duty of care on therapists
to third parties would have adverse consequences for therapists and society).
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The court's responses to four arguments illustrate how physician liability
may expand without impinging on the physician-patient relationship.' 47
First, the California Supreme Court considered the defendant's conten-
tion that expanding physician liability would be unworkable because mental
health professionals cannot correctly predict violence in the majority of
cases.'48 The court conceded the difficulty in making an accurate prediction
of violence, 149 but noted that, under the traditional standard of due care
imposed on physicians,"5 the physician need not make a flawless forecast.'
In that sense, the court felt that a duty of reasonable care toward endangered
nonpatients was no different than the duties that doctors otherwise have.'52
In reply to a related amicus curiae argument, the court stated that courts
should not exonerate a physician who accurately predicts patient violence
yet fails to act.
53
Next, the Tarasoff court considered the amicus argument that the court's
decision was inconsistent with precedent recognizing the uncertainty of
therapeutic predictions. 154 In People v. Burnick,'55 the California Supreme
Court held that the state could not commit an individual as a mentally dis-
turbed sex offender in the absence of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
56
147., See infra notes 14864 and accompanying text (discussing how Tarasoff court
expanded liability without impinging on physician-patient relationship).
148. Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 344-45 (Cal. 1976). Amicus
arguments claimed that, when it comes to predicting violence, therapists are more often
wrong than right, with therapists tending to overpredict violence. Id. at 344.
149. Id. at 345.
150. See id. (outlining standard of care by which courts judge therapists' conduct). In
determining whether a patient presents a serious danger of violence, "the therapist need only
exercise 'that reasonable degree of skill, knowledge, and care ordinarily possessed and
exercised by members of [that professional specialty] under similar circumstances.'" Id.
151. Id.
152. Cf. id. (pointing out that therapist predictions of violence are similar to judgments
that physicians must make regularly under rules of responsibility).
153. See id. at 345-46. The court noted that, when a therapist knows or should know
that a patient presents a serious threat of violence to others, social policy supported placing
the interests of the potential victim above the interests of the patient. Id.
154. Id. at 346.
155. 535 P.2d 352 (Cal. 1975).
156. People v. Burnick, 535 P.2d 352, 354 (Cal. 1975). In Burnick, the California
Supreme Court considered the proper standard of proof in mentally disordered sex offender
proceedings. Id. Appellee allegedly had sexual contact with two male minors, for which
conduct appellee was criminally charged. Id. at 355. At appellee's hearing, three psychia-
trists gave widely differing conclusions as to appellee's status as a mentally disordered sex
offender. Id. at 355-56. The state presented no other witnesses or evidence at the hearing.
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That court based its decision partly on the uncertainty of therapeutic predic-
tions. ' Thus, the amicus argued that, by imposing on therapists a duty of
care to accurately predict violence, the court's decision was inconsistent with
precedent. 5  However, the Tarasoff court distinguished Burnick on the
ground that, while the earlier case involved the extreme measure of incarcer-
ation, Tarasoffs ruling merely requires that the therapist take some steps,
which can include less drastic alternatives to incarceration. 59 Furthermore,
the court noted that the chance of a superfluous warning could not warrant
negating liability, especially given the importance of protecting the lives of
potential victims. 'I
Finally, the California Supreme Court confronted the defendant's policy
argument that imposing liability would threaten the free and open communi-
cation essential to psychotherapy.' ' The court recognized the strong public
interests both in treating mental illness and in preserving the confidentiality
of that treatment.162 However, the court weighed these interests against the
public interest in avoiding violent assault and decided that the scales tipped
in favor of the latter.'63 Having considered these policy issues, the court
Id. at 356. The trial court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that appellee was a
mentally disordered sex offender. Id. The California Supreme Court held that the state and
federal due process clauses required that such a finding be justified by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id. at 369. The court based this decision on the loss of liberty and the
stigma attached to being labeled a mentally disordered sex offender. Id. at 360-64.
157. See id. at 364-67 (dealing with state's argument that "predictive" nature of sexual
psychopath proceedings warrants lower standard of proof than "beyond a reasonable doubt").
The Burnick court felt that "the inherently speculative nature of psychiatric predictions,
resulting in confinement not for what one has done but for what one will do, demands more
than minimal procedures, particularly when such confinement is accomplished outside the
traditional criminal process, with its right to jury trial and other ancient safeguards." Id. at
367 (quoting Sarzen v. Gaughan, 489 F.2d 1076, 1086 (1st Cir. 1973)).
158. Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 346 (Cal. 1976).
159. Id. Indeed, the Burnick court heavily emphasized the drastic nature of involuntary
confinement. See Burnick, 535 P.2d at 360 (describing commitment to state hospital). In
describing the California state hospital that housed mentally disturbed sex offenders, the court
stated, "Let us not deceive ourselves as to the nature of that institution." Id. According to
the court, even the California Medical Association felt that the institution was more like a
prison than a hospital, at least in its physical appearance. Id. at 360-61 & n.10.
160. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 346.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 346-47. The Tarasoff court based its conclusion on two factors that lessened
the decision's seemingly adverse impact on psychotherapy. First, the legislature had
established an evidentiary exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege when the
psychotherapist reasonably believed that the patient posed a danger to the patient or others
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reaffirmed its expansion of therapist liability to nonpatients.'"
Tarasoff is thus useful for two purposes. First, the case offers a useful
methodology for approaching the extension of physician liability.165 Second,
the decision demonstrates how some courts deal with policy considerations."6
But one should not overstate Tarasoff s value to the current endeavor. Al-
though the decision suggests an analytical framework for other courts to
follow, the facts in the case necessitated reference to policy considerations
that are somewhat - although not altogether - different from those in
Ramona-type cases."6 Therefore, one also should consider cases more factu-
ally similar to Ramona for a more fruitful comparison.'
2. Negligent Misdiagnosis Suits by Family Members:
A Similar Line of Precedent
The scenario with which courts have dealt that is most analogous to
recovered-memory situations involves individuals who have sued physicians
for the negligent misdiagnosis of sexual abuse.'69 In these cases, a family
member who allegedly has sexually abused a young child brings suit against
such that disclosure was necessary to prevent the danger. Id. Second, the court noted that
disclosure of a patient's propensity for violence does not violate professional ethics, which
allow physicians to compromise a patient's confidence when such disclosure is necessary to
protect an individual or the community. Id. at 347.
164. Id. at 348.
165. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text (outlining methodology to determine
whether to impose duty).
166. See supra notes 142-64 and accompanying text (describing policy argument section
of Tarasoff).
167. See infra notes 201-87 and accompanying text (weighing policy considerations rele-
vant to Ramona-type cases).
168. See infra notes 169-200 and accompanying text (examining negligent misdiagnosis
suits by family members).
169. See, e.g., Chatman v. Millis, 517 S.W.2d 504, 505 (Ark. 1975) (considering
whether nonpatient could sue for misdiagnosis of parental abuse); Montoya v. Bebensee, 761
P.2d 285, 288 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (examining expansion of physician duty to alleged child
molester); Bird v. W.C.W., 868 S.W.2d 767, 772 (rex. 1994) (considering whether parent
has cause of action against mental health professional for negligent misdiagnosis). But see
Sullivan v. Cheshier, 846 F. Supp. 654, 660 & n.7 (N.D. III. 1994) (holding that parents
could not sue therapist for negligently implanting false memories into child's mind). The
court, failing to weigh policy factors, simply held that parents can sue for damages to a
parent-child relationship only when the alleged malpractice caused the death of the child. Id.
Because of the later Ramona decision and the Sullivan court's failure to weigh policy
considerations, the negligent misdiagnosis cases offer a more fruitful analogy to Ramona-type
cases.
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the physician who had made the diagnosis of sexual abuse."17 Not surpris-
ingly, little case precedent exists, and most of the cases are fairly recent."'
Moreover, these cases generally analyze the problem similarly, even though
the resolutions differ wildly. "
Only one of the cases predates Tarasoff, and, perhaps only coinciden-
tally, the case does not weigh policy factors. In Chatman v. Millis,173 the
Arkansas Supreme Court considered whether a nonpatient could sue a psy-
chologist who diagnosed parental abuse of the nonpatient's young son." The
Chatman court held that the nonpatient could not maintain such a suit.175 The
Arkansas court followed a line of overwhelming legal precedent to rule that
a physician-patient relationship must exist in order to maintain a malpractice
suit against a physician.176
The next case, Montoya v. Bebensee,1" came twelve years after Tara-
soff. Montoya illustrates a methodology for courts considering the expansion
170. See infra notes 173-200 and accompanying text (describing negligent misdiagnosis
cases).
171. See infra notes 173-200 (describing limited line of recent negligent misdiagnosis
cases).
172. See, e.g., hatman, 517 S.W.2d at 506 (requiring physician-patient relationship in
order to maintain malpractice suit); Montoya, 761 P.2d at 289 (finding therapist owed duty
of care to nonpatient accused of sexual abuse); Bird, 868 S.W.2d at 770 (denying existence
of duty of mental health professional not to misdiagnose condition of child).
173. 517 S.W.2d 504 (Ark. 1975).
174. Chatnan v. Millis, 517 S.W.2d 504, 505 (Ark. 1975). In Chatnan, the Arkansas
Supreme Court considered whether a nonpatient accused of sexually molesting his child could
bring a malpractice suit against the psychologist who accused the nonpatient of sexual abuse.
Id. Appellant's ex-wife, fearing that appellant had "subjected [their] child to homosexual
conduct," sought the help of appellee, a psychologist, in determining whether appellant had
sexually molested the child. Id. After speaking with the child, appellee formed the opinion
that appellant had sexually abused the child and wrote appellant's ex-wife's attorney, relating
this diagnosis and appellee's willingness to testify in court. Id. Appellant filed suit against
appellee, claiming, among other things, malpractice. Id. The Chatman court held that
appellant could not bring such a suit. Id. at 505-06. First, the court stated that malpractice
suits do not require a contractual agreement between the doctor and the patient. Id. at 506.
However, the court said that a plaintiff could not bring a malpractice suit in the absence of
some physician-patient relationship. Id. Because appellant was not appellee's patient and
appellee's diagnosis was not for appellant's benefit, the Chatman court found that the
requisite physician-patient relationship did not exist. Id. Consequently, the court held that
appellant could not bring a malpractice action against appellee. Id.
175. Id.
176. See id. (requiring existence of doctor-patient relationship before negligence can be
found); see also supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text (discussing requirement of
physician-patient relationship in order to maintain medical malpractice action).
177. 761 P.2d 285 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988).
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of physician liability to alleged child molesters. 178 The Colorado Court of
Appeals held that courts confronted with this problem should weigh the risk,
the foreseeability, and the likelihood of the injury against the social utility
of the actor's conduct, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the
injury or harm, and the consequences of imposing a duty on the actor.'7 In
the Montoya court's opinion, the scales tipped in favor of imposjig liability
on the mental health provider. "0 The court recognized the so ial utility of
having therapists report suspected child abuse. 8' However, the Colorado
court noted the significant risk of severe injury to one falsely/labeled a child
molester."S Furthermore, the court found that the foreseeability of the in-
jury, coupled with the fact that the burden is no greater than the duty of
reasonable care normally required of doctors, warranted the expansion of
physician liability.8"
The next three reported opinions concerning this difficult issue came
from Texas courts and followed Montoya's model of policy consideration.
178. See Montoya v. Bebensee, 761 P.2d 285, 288-89 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (listing
factors that courts should consider when determining whether one party owes duty of care
to another party). In Montoya, the Colorado Court of Appeals considered whether a mental
health care provider owes a duty to a nonpatient to use due care in formulating an opinion
upon which a public report or other adverse recommendation concerning the nonpatient is
based. Id. Appellant's ex-wife had engaged appellee, the unlicensed associate of a licensed
psychologist, to render an opinion on whether appellant had sexually abused their child. Id.
at 287. On the basis of appellee's opinion that appellant had sexually abused the child, she
filed a report of suspected child abuse with the county, advised appellant's ex-wife to restrict
appellant's visitation rights with the child, and testified at a hearing that appellant undoubt-
edly sexually abused his child. Id. Asserting negligence, appellant brought suit against
appellee. Id. at 288. The Montoya court concluded that appellee owed appellant a duty of
care. Id. First, the Colorado court recognized the public interest of having therapists report
suspected child abuse. Id. However, the court also noted the risk of severe injury to
individuals who are falsely accused of being child abusers. Id. Moreover, the Montoya
court acknowledged that the harm to appellant was readily foreseeable. Id. Finally, the
court pointed out that the burden of due care placed on therapists is similar to the duty that
courts place upon substantially all professionals. Id. at 289. On the basis of these factors,
the Colorado Court of Appeals held that appellee owed appellant a duty of care. Id.
179. Id. at 288 (quoting Smith v. Denver, 726 P.2d 1125 (Colo. 1986)).
180. See id. at 289 (holding that mental health care provider owed duty to nonpatient
to use due care in formulating opinion upon which public report or other adverse recom-
mendation regarding nonpatient is based).
181. See id. at 288 (stating that court considered "the great social utility of having
therapists make reports of suspected child abuse").
182. See id. (noting that court recognized "the significant risk of substantial injury that
may occur to one who is falsely accused of being a child abuser").
183. Id. at 288-89.
HAS TIME REWRI1TEN EVERYLINE?
In Vineyard v. Kraft,1 4 the Texas Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth
District decided that a nonpatient could not sue a physician who determined
that the nonpatient had sexually abused the nonpatient's child. 15 The
Vineyard court focused on the growing awareness of, and concern over,
parental sexual abuse of children and the strong need for doctors to evaluate
and alert courts of such abuse without fear of liability." Thus, the social
utility of the diagnosing physician's conduct weighed against extending liabil-
ity to nonpatients. " However, in W.C.W. v. Bird, s8" the Texas Court of
Appeals for the First District looked at the same policy factors"89 and found
184. 828 S.W.2d 248 (rex. Ct. App. 1992).
185. Vineyard v. Kraft, 828 S.W.2d 248, 254 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992). In Vineyard, the
Texas Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District considered whether a legal duty arises
between a nonpatient parent and a mental health professional who makes an evaluation that
the nonpatient parent has sexually abused his or her child. Id. at 252. While involved in
divorce and custody proceedings, appellant's wife took their child to appellees to see if
appellant had sexually abused the child. Id. at 249-50. Appellee DeAlmeida, testifying at
the divorce and custody trial, recommended to the court that appellant not be the child's
primary caretaker. Id. at 250-51. Appellant brought suit against appellees for negligent
misdiagnosis. Id. at 251. The Vineyard court recognized that appellant's harm was a
foreseeable result of appellees' opinion that appellant may have sexually abused his daughter.
Id. at 253. However, the Texas court found that several factors weighed against the appel-
lant's right to sue, including society's growing awareness of child sexual abuse, the inability
of small children to report such abuse, the protection of children from such abuse, the need
for professionals to evaluate sexual abuse allegations without fear of civil liability, parents'
needs to have professionals to evaluate sexual abuse allegations without fear of civil liability,
parents' needs to have professionals evaluate their children, and courts' needs to know all
opinions concerning whether a parent sexually abused a child. Id. at 253-54. According to
the court, allowing appellant to sue appellees would undermine these social utility factors.
Id. at 254. Thus, the Vineyard court held that appellees owed appellant no duty. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. 840 S.W.2d 50 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
189. W.C.W. v. Bird, 840 S.W.2d 50, 55 (rex. Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Otis Eng'g
Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 309 (rex. 1983)), rev'd, 868 S.W.2d 767 (rex. 1994). In
Bird, the Texas Court of Appeals for the First District considered whether a nonpatient parent
has a cause of action against a psychologist for the negligent misdiagnosis of sexual abuse by
the parent. Id. at 51. Appellant's former wife sought psychological counseling for their son
after he had claimed that appellant had sexually abused him. Id. After interviewing the son,
appellee Bird executed an affidavit that contained appellee's conclusion that appellant had
sexually abused the child. Id. at 51-52. On the basis of appellee's opinion, a police officer
in the juvenile sex crimes division filed charges against appellant for sexually assaulting the
child. Id. at 52. Appellant then filed suit against appellee for negligent misdiagnosis. Id.
at 51. The Texas court of appeals first noted that the underlying basis of liability in all
negligence cases is foreseeable harm. Id. at 55. The court then noted that appellant's harm
was foreseeable. Id. at 55-56. The Bird court also recognized that precedent rejected the
53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 763 (1996)
that the social utility of diagnosing child abuse was not enough to exonerate
physicians whose negligent diagnoses lead to false accusations of sexual
molestation.'° In the court's opinion, the foreseeability of the risk and the
severity of the injury to the alleged child abuser was too great.'91 The Texas
Supreme Court disagreed, however, in Bird v. W.C.W., 11 and reversed the
Texas court of appeals.'93 The court based its reversal and refusal to extend
physician liability to nonpatients in part on the inexact nature of the mental
medical sciences."9 Also, like the Vineyard court, the Texas Supreme Court
put great weight on the social utility of discovering child abuse and believed
that courts must allow physicians to conduct examinations without fear of
liability.
195
The final case, Caryl S. v. Child & Adolescent Treatment Services,
Inc. ," did not specifically enumerate the six factors relied upon by the other
four courts."97 However, the Caryl court considered many of the same
claim that a physician owes no duty to nonpatients. Id. at 55. Thus, the Bird court held that
appellant stated a cause of action for negligent misdiagnosis against appellees. Id. at 56.
190. See id. (holding that appellant's petition alleged duty of psychologist to nonpatient
parent).
191. See id. at 55-56 (finding that harm to parent arising from negligent misdiagnosis
was foreseeable and could cause alleged abuser "emotional trauma, the loss of relationships,
and problems with the parent's employment").
192. 868 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. 1994).
193. Bird v. W.C.W., 868 S.W.2d 767, 772 (Tex. 1994), rev'g 840 S.W.2d 50 (rex.
Ct. App. 1992). In Bird, the Texas Supreme Court considered whether a mental health
professional owes a duty to a parent not to negligently misdiagnose a condition of the child.
Id. at 769. In reversing the Texas court of appeals, the Texas Supreme Court first acknowl-
edged that the harm to a parent accused of sexual abuse is foreseeable. Id. However, the
court stated that foreseeability alone is not sufficient to create a new duty. Id. The Bird court
then noted the social utility of eradicating sexual abuse and how evaluating children is
essential to that goal. Id. On that basis, the Texas Supreme Court held that mental health
professionals do not owe a duty to parents not to negligently misdiagnose children as having
been sexually abused. Id. at 770.
194. See id. at 769 (recognizing risk of false accusations as result of inexact nature of
psychology).
195. See id. (finding that mental health professionals should be able to exercise profes-
sional judgment in diagnosing sexual abuse without duty to third parties).
196. 614 N.Y.S.2d 661 (Sup. Ct. 1994).
197. See Caryl S. v. Child & Adolescent Treatment Servs., Inc., 614 N.Y.S.2d 661,
664-67 (Sup. Ct. 1994) (determining whether professional counselor owed duty to nonpatient
grandmother in formulating opinion whether grandmother sexually abused grandchild). In
Caryl S., the Supreme Court of Erie County, New York, considered whether a nonpatient
could bring a negligent misdiagnosis action against a professional counselor whose diagnosis
included allegations that the nonpatient sexually abused the nonpatient's grandchild. Id. at
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factors. 98 The Supreme Court of Erie County focused on the potential harm
to the alleged abuser and noted that the label of "child abuser" is one of the
most "loathsome" with which society can brand an individual."9 Because of
this potential stigma, the New York court ruled that a medical professional
owed a duty of reasonable care to a nonpatient alleged abuser.'
Thus, these cases, though not exactly analogous to Ramona-type cases,
offer examples of the types of policy considerations that courts consider when
contemplating the expansion of physician liability to nonpatients accused of
sexually abusing children. In conjunction with the methodology suggested
in Tarasoff, these cases present a coherent way in which to determine whether
courts should expand physician accountability to nonpatients injured by doc-
tors' negligent application of recovered-memory therapy.
C. Should Psychotherapists Be Liable to Nonpatient Family Members in
Ramona-type Cases?: A Review of Relevant Policy Considerations
As noted above, in determining whether to expand physician liability to
nonpatients, courts have weighed the magnitude of the nonpatient's harm
against the social utility of the physician's conduct. t" If the magnitude of
664. Appellee Jones, a professional counselor, examined appellant's granddaughter and
concluded that appellant had sexually abused her granddaughter. Id. at 663. Subsequently,
appellee Jones recommended that appellant only have supervised visitation with her grand-
daughter. Id. Appellant brought suit against appellee Jones and others, claiming, among
other things, negligent misdiagnosis on appellee's part. Id. The Caryl S. court first noted
that courts should determine the existence and the scope of a duty on the basis of "larger
social consequences." Id. at 664-65. In keeping with this methodology, the New York court
acknowledged that the sexual abuse of children by family members had become a major social
concern. Id. at 665. The court also acknowledged, however, that the efforts to protect
children from familial sexual abuse had had some "unfortunate downside effects," including
the suffering of innocent parents. Id. The Caryl S. court further noted that the label of "child
abuser" is one of the worst that an individual can wear. Id. at 666. Because of the dangers
of severe harm to the accused nonpatient, the New York court concluded that
where the determination of sexual abuse is made by a professional treating a child,
with subsequent actions taken based upon that determination and aimed, whether
in whole or in part, at shaping not only the conduct and well-being of the child but
also the conduct of the suspected abuser, or the relationship between them, a duty
of care is owed not only to the child but also to the alleged abuser.
Id. at 667.
198. See id. at 664-67 (considering public policy in determining whether duty exists).
199. Id. at 666-67 (quoting Rossignol v. Silvemail, 586 N.Y.S.2d 343, 345 (App. Div.
1992)).
200. Id. at 667.
201. See Montoya v. Bebensee, 761 P.2d 285, 288 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that
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the harm outweighs the social utility of the conduct, then the court will im-
pose a duty of care on the physician.' On the other hand, if the social utility
of the conduct has more force, then the court will refrain from imposing a
legal burden on the physician."
Determining the magnitude of the nonpatient's harm requires a court to
consider three factors: (1) the foreseeability of harm to the nonpatient; 4
courts should weigh risk, foreseeability, and likelihood of injury against social utility of
actor's conduct, magnitude of defendant's burden in avoiding harm, and consequences of
burden) (quoting Smith v. Denver, 726 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Colo. 1986)); Bird v. W.C.W., 868
S.W.2d 767, 769 (Tex. 1994) (determining that court must consider "risk, foreseeability, and
likelihood of injury weighed against the social utility of the actor's conduct, the magnitude
of the burden of guarding against the injury and the consequences of placing that burden on
the actor") (citing Otis Eng'g Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Tex. 1983)), rev'g 840
S.W.2d 50 (rex. Ct. App. 1992); W.C.W. v. Bird, 840 S.W.2d 50, 55 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992)
(same), rev'd, 868 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. 1994); Vineyard v. Kraft, 828 S.W.2d 248, 253 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1992) (same); cf. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal.
1976) (stating that courts should consider foreseeability, certainty of harm, closeness of
connection between defendant's conduct and plaintiff's harm, defendant's moral blame, policy
of preventing future harm, burden on defendant, consequences to community of imposing
burden, and insurance considerations). According to the American Law Institute,
[w]here an act is one which a reasonable man would recognize as involving a risk
of harm to another, the risk is unreasonable and the act is negligent if the risk is
of such magnitude as to outweigh what the law regards as the utility of the act or
of the particular manner in which it is done.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 113, § 291. Many courts have adopted a
similar test. For example, one court, in determining whether a mental health provider owed
a duty to a nonpatient, said that the question involves "consideration of many factors includ-
ing, for example, the risk involved, the foreseeability and likelihood of injury as weighed
against the social utility of the actor's conduct, the magnitude of the burden of guarding
against injury or harm, and the consequences of placing the burden upon the actor." Mon-
toya, 761 P.2d at 288 (quoting Smith v. Denver, 726 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Colo. 1986)). Other
courts, while not explicitly recognizing a "harm vs. utility" dichotomy, balance similar policy
factors, such as
the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff
suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct
and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the
policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and
consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting
liability for breach, and the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance for the
risk involved.
Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 342 (quoting Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968)).
202. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 113, § 291 (stating that act is
negligent if magnitude of risk outweighs legal utility of act).
203. See id. (same).
204. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976) (listing
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(2) the certainty of harm; 5 and (3) the risk involved. 2 Courts usually
regard foreseeability as the most important factor,' although some courts
disagree about foreseeability's persuasive force.' °s The certainty of the harm
refers to the court's confidence that the conduct in question has caused
injury.' Finally, courts considering the risk involved will look to at least
three factors: (1) the plaintiff's desert;21 (2) the qualitative harm;2  and
(3) the quantitative harm. 2 The plaintiff's desert is the social value that the
law (or society) attributes to the plaintiff's imperiled interests. The qualita-
tive harm refers to the nature of harm that the actor's conduct will cause to
"foreseeability" as factor for courts to consider) (quoting Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d
561, 564 (Cal. 1968)); Montoya v. Bebensee, 761 P.2d 285, 288 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988)
(same) (quoting Smith v. Denver, 726 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Colo. 1986)); Bird v. W.C.W., 868
S.W.2d 767, 769 (Tex. 1994) (same), rev'g 840 S.W.2d 50 (rex. Ct. App. 1992); W.C.W.
v. Bird, 840 S.W.2d 50, 55 (rex. Ct. App. 1992) (same), rev'd, 868 S.W.2d 767 (rex.
1994); Vineyard v. Kraft, 828 S.W.2d 248, 253 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (same) (quoting Otis
Eng'g Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Tex. 1983)).
205. See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 342 (listing "certainty of harm" as factor for courts to
consider) (quoting Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968)); Montoya, 761 P.2d
at 288 (same) (quoting Smith v. Denver, 726 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Colo. 1986)); Bird, 868
S.W.2d at 769 (same); Bird, 840 S.W.2d at 55 (same); Vineyard, 828 S.W.2d at 253 (same)
(quoting Otis Eng'g Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Tex. 1983)).
206. See Montoya, 761 P.2d at 288 (listing "risk involved" as factor that courts should
consider) (quoting Smith v. Denver, 726 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Colo. 1986)); Bird, 868 S.W.2d
at 769 (same); Bird, 840 S.W.2d at 55 (same); Vineyard, 828 S.W.2d at 253 (same) (quoting
Otis Eng'g Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Tex. 1983)).
207. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976) (stating
that "foreseeability" is most important consideration in establishing duty); see also Mitchell
v. Amarillo Hosp. Dist., 855 S.W.2d 857, 873 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (same), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 510 (1994).
208. Compare Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 343 (leaving open possibility that foreseeability
alone could be sufficient justification for creating duty) with Bird, 868 S.W.2d at 769 (stating
that foreseeability alone is insufficient basis for creating new duty).
209. See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 342 (noting that courts determining whether to impose
duty consider the degree of certainty that plaintiff suffered injury).
210. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 113, § 293 (stating that social
value that law attaches to plaintiff's imperiled interests is factor courts consider in determin-
ing magnitude of risk).
211. See id. (listing extent of harm to plaintiffs imperiled interests as factor courts
consider in determining magnitude of risk).
212. See id. (listing number of persons likely harmed by conduct as factor courts
consider in determining magnitude of risk).
213. See infra notes 240-42 and accompanying text (describing value that law and society
in general attribute to nonpatient's imperiled interests).
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the plaintiff.2"4 Deciding the quantitative harm question requires a computa-
tion of the total number of persons whom the defendant's action will poten-
tially damage.215
Calculating the social utility of the physician's conduct compels the court
to appraise at least three factors: (1) the social value of the actor's conduct;2 6
(2) the magnitude of the burden on the defendant to avoid the injury to the
plaintiff;217 and (3) the societal costs of assessing a legal burden on the defen-
dant.21 Determining the social value of the actor's conduct requires a court
to weigh the public interest that the defendant advances,219 the likelihood that
the conduct actually will advance the interest,' and the availability of less
dangerous alternatives that will protect the societal interest adequately. 1 The
214. See infra notes 243-47 and accompanying text (describing qualitative harm).
215. See infra notes 248-49 and accompanying text (describing quantitative harm).
216. See Montoya v. Bebensee, 761 P.2d 285, 288 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (listing "the
social utility of the actor's conduct" as factor that courts should consider) (quoting Smith v.
Denver, 726 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Colo. 1986)); Bird v. W.C.W., 868 S.W.2d 767, 769 (Tex.
1994) (discussing social utility of actor's conduct as factor for consideration) (citing Otis
Eng'g Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Tex. 1983)), rev'g 840 S.W.2d 50 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1992); W.C.W. v. Bird, 840 S.W.2d 50, 55 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (same), rev'd, 868
S.W.2d 767 (Tex. 1994); Vineyard v. Kraft, 828 S.W.2d 248, 253 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992)
(same); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 113, § 292 (stating that courts
determining utility of defendant's conduct consider conduct's value to society).
217. See Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976) (stating
that courts should consider "the extent of the burden to the defendant") (quoting Rowland v.
Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968)); Montoya, 761 P.2d at 288 (listing "the magnitude
of the burden of guarding against injury or harm" as factor that courts should consider)
(quoting Smith v. Denver, 726 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Colo. 1986)); Bird, 868 S.W.2d at 769
(considering magnitude of burden of guarding against injury) (citing Otis Eng'g Corp. v.
Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Tex. 1983)); Bird, 840 S.W.2d at 55 (same); Vineyard, 828
S.W.2d at 253 (same).
218. See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 342 (stating that courts should consider "consequences
to the community" of imposing duty) (quoting Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal.
1968)); Montoya, 761 P.2d at 288 (listing "the consequences of placing the burden upon the
actor" as factor that courts should consider) (quoting Smith v. Denver, 726 P.2d 1125, 1127
(Colo. 1986)); Bird, 868 S.W.2d at 769 (stating that courts should consider consequences of
placing burden on actor) (citing Otis Eng'g Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Tex.
1983)); Bird, 840 S.W.2d at 55 (same); Vineyard, 828 S.W.2d at 253 (same).
219. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 113, § 292 (stating that courts
determining utility of actor's conduct consider social value that law attaches to interest that
defendant's conduct advances).
220. See id. (stating that courts determining utility of defendant's conduct consider extent
of chance that defendant's conduct actually will advance interest that conduct allegedly
forwards).
221. See id. (stating that courts determining utility of actor's conduct consider extent of
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magnitude of the burden on the defendant to avoid harm to the plaintiff's
interests involves considerations of the defendant's ability to bear the imposed
duty, as well as the defendant's ability to bear or distribute the costs of this
duty. 2' Finally, calculating the societal consequences of imposing a duty
requires a court to consider the possible harm to the community that making
the actor accountable would cause.3 Using these factors, courts can deter-
mine whether to expand psychotherapist liability to include nonpatient family
members injured by the psychotherapist's negligent utilization of
recovered-memory therapy.
1. The Magnitude of the Nonpatient's Harm
a. The Foreseeability of Harm
The foreseeability of the harm to the nonpatient is the most important
factor in determining whether to impose a duty on the negligent psychothera-
pist,' 4 but foreseeability alone generally will not warrant the imposition of a
duty of care.Y In Ramona-type cases, the nonpatient family member's harm
usually will depend on whether the patient believes the implanted memories
and on the degree to which the allegations become public knowledge.' If the
patient believes the memories of sexual abuse, then the nonpatient's relation-
ship with the patient will suffer and the nonpatient will suffer some degree of
emotional distress. For example, Gary Ramona's daughter, who believed her
recovered memories of sexual abuse, refused to associate with her father. 7
chance that less dangerous conduct could adequately advance alleged interest).
222. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 100, § 4, at 24 (recognizing courts' consideration
of ability of respective party to bear loss). According to Prosser and Keeton, the relative
ability of the respective parties to bear a loss
is not so much a matter of their respective wealth, although certainly juries, and
sometimes judges, are not indisposed to favor the poor against the rich. Rather
it is a matter of their capacity to avoid the loss, or to absorb it, or to pass it along
and distribute it in smaller portions among a larger group.
Id.
223. See Bird v. W.C.W., 868 S.W.2d 767, 769 (rex. 1994) (considering possible
adverse consequences to community if court imposes duty), rev'g, 840 S.W. 2d 50 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1992).
224. See supra note 207 and accompanying text (describing foreseeability as most
important factor).
225. See supra note 208 and accompanying text (demonstrating how foreseeability is not
clearly sufficient by itself to impose duty).
226. Cf. supra note 199 and accompanying text (noting how society loathes child
abusers).
227. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (noting how Gary Ramona's daughter
refused to associate with him).
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Understandably, Gary Ramona grieved over this IOSS.228 In addition, to the
extent that these allegations become public, the accusations will damage the
nonpatient's reputation and ties with other family members, employers, and
society in general. For example, after his daughter's allegations, Gary
Ramona's wife divorced him, his other daughter refused to see him, and his
employer fired him. 9
These nonpatient injuries are foreseeable if the psychotherapist, being
an individual of ordinary intelligence and prudence, reasonably should antici-
pate these nonpatient injuries.230 Under this standard, the nonpatient's inju-
ries are foreseeable. As noted earlier, the label of "child molester" brands
an individual with one of the most loathsome titles that society can give."
Neither this stigma nor the damage that such a character taint can wreak on
an individual's relationships, emotional stability, and reputation is obscure."
More particularly, the physician can foresee an injury to nonpatient family
members. Because of the prevalence of intrafamily sexual abuse, family
members are foreseeable victims of implanted memories of sexual abuse,233
particularly when the psychotherapist suggests the family member's guilt to
the patient through leading questions. 2' Thus, the foreseeability of the harm
weighs in favor of extending psychotherapist liability.
b. The Certainty of Harm
In calculating the certainty of harm, courts must distinguish between
determining whether the nonpatient suffered harm and deciding whether the
228. See Cole, supra note 8, at A3 (describing how Ramona claimed that therapists
destroyed his family).
229. See Butler, supra note 9, at 12 (describing effect of accusations on Ramona's family
and job); Slind-Flor, supra note 32, at A10 (same).
230. Cf. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 649 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "foreseeability").
According to Black's, harm is foreseeable if the "actor, as [a] person of ordinary intelligence
and prudence, should reasonably have anticipated danger to others created by his negligent
act." Id.
231. See Caryl S. v. Child & Adolescent Treatment Servs., Inc., 614 N.Y.S.2d 661, 666
(Sup. Ct. 1994) (quoting Rossignol v. Silvernail, 586 N.Y.S.2d 343, 345 (App. Div. 1992)).
232. See Vineyard v. Kraft, 828 S.W.2d 248, 253 (rex. Ct. App. 1992) (acknowledging
that harm to family relationship and mental anguish are foreseeable result of mental health
professional's opinion that parent may be "culprit of a repugnant sexual crime").
233. See Carolyn L. Mueller, Ohio Homeowners Beware: Your Homeowner's Insurance
Premium May Be Subsidizing Child Sexual Abuse, 20 U. DAYTON L. REv. 341, 341 n.2
(1994) (quoting study on child abuse that found that 70% of reported child sexual abuse cases
involved intrafamily abuse).
234. See Kanovitz, supra note 64, at 1189 (showing example of therapist's leading
questions to patient concerning whether family member abused patient).
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psychotherapist reached the wrong result.235 The question is not whether
the psychotherapist's conduct injured a blameless nonpatient, but whether
the nonpatient actually suffered harm.2 36 Requiring a nonpatient to prove
his or her innocence to show injury not only seems unjust, but also would
be impossible in some instances, given science's limited knowledge of the
237functioning of memory.
However, courts can evaluate with certainty that the psychotherapist's
conduct has injured the nonpatient. While the court cannot look into the
nonpatient's mind to discover emotional distress, the court can presume that
alleged child abusers naturally suffer emotional distress.2 38 Furthermore,
nonpatients can empirically prove damaged relationships and lost jobs.
239
Thus, an examination of the certainty of harm weighs in favor of extending
psychotherapist liability in Ramona-type cases.
c. The Risk Involved
In order to determine the risk to nonpatient family members, the court
must look at three factors. First, the court must consider the value that the
law and society in general attribute to the nonpatient's imperiled interests. 240
Ramona demonstrated that accusations of incest can damage an individual's
reputation, familial relationships, job stability, and emotional well-being. 241
Both society and the law highly value each of these interests, especially the
235. Cf. Cole, supra note 8, at A3 (noting that jury that awarded Gary Ramona damages
could not determine veracity of allegedly recovered memories).
236. Cf. Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976) (listing
factors courts should consider when determining whether to impose duty on defendant).
While the Tarasoff court listed "the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury" as
a factor for courts to consider, the California Supreme Court did not state that courts should
consider the moral blame of the plaintiff. Id. Thus, because the Tarasoff list of factors
included "the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct," the court arguably did not
believe that courts should consider the plaintiff's innocence in determining the certainty of
the plaintiffs harm. Id.
237. See supra notes 69-84 and accompanying text (describing tenuous system of
memory recall).
238. C. Vineyard v. Kraft, 828 S.W.2d 248, 253 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (acknowledging
that mental anguish is foreseeable result of mental health professional's opinion that parent
may have abused parent's child).
239. Cf. supra note 37 and accompanying text (describing how Gary Ramona lost his job
and family after his daughter accused him of molesting her).
240. See supra notes 210, 213 and accompanying text (outlining policy consideration of
plaintiff's desert).
241. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (demonstrating damage that can result
from incest allegations).
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sanctity of the family. 2 Thus, the social value of the nonpatient's imperiled
interests weighs in favor of expanding psychotherapist liability.
Second, the court must calculate how much the psychotherapist's con-
duct will harm the nonpatient.243 Because of the loathsome position of child
molesters in society, few doubt that the recovered-memory therapist's negli-
gence can severely damage the nonpatient's interests. 2' Gary Ramona's
wife divorced him, and his daughters refused to have contact with him.24
Given the place of family unity in our society, it is difficult to imagine how
Ramona could have suffered greater injury.246 Ramona also lost his job -
an extreme injury to his financial status.247 Thus, if the patient makes false
accusations and the public widely believes those allegations, the nonpatient
can suffer severe injury.
Finally, the court must consider the total number of persons potentially
injured by the psychotherapist's actions.248 The quantitative harm is particu-
larly relevant to Ramona-type cases because the nonpatient necessarily
suffers his or her injuries with others. For example, Gary Ramona's wife
and daughters had to endure the same traumatic family division that Gary
did.249 The nonpatient is not the only one who suffers when the patient
falsely accuses the nonpatient. Therefore, the broad reach of the injury,
coupled with the severe damage to the nonpatient's socially and legally
recognized interests, tips the scales in favor of extending psychotherapist
liability.
242. See Linda R. Crane, Family Values and the Supreme Court, 25 CONN. L. REV. 427,
428-29 (1993) (noting that family unit is fundamental social institution that always has con-
cerned state lawmakers).
243. See supra notes 211, 214 and accompanying text (describing policy consideration
of qualitative harm).
244. See supra note 199 and accompanying text (noting that "child molester" is one of
worst labels individual can have).
245. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (noting how incest allegations divided
Ramona from his family).
246. See Crane, supra note 242, at 428-29 (noting that family unit is fundamental social
institution that always has concerned state lawmakers).
247. Supra note 37 and accompanying text (noting that Ramona lost his position as sales
and marketing vice president for Mondavi winery after incest allegations).
248. Supra notes 212, 215 and accompanying text (describing policy consideration of
quantitative harm).
249. See Katy Butler, Memory Case Loser Hires Gloria Allred, S.F. CHRON., July 27,
1994, at Al (noting that Gary Ramona's daughter sued Ramona in sexual abuse lawsuit);
supra note 37 and accompanying text (n6ting that Ramona's wife divorced him).
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2. The Social Utility of the Psychotherapist's Conduct
a. The Social Value of the Psychotherapist's Conduct
Given society's growing recognition of, and concern over, the existence
of parental sexual abuse of children, few would argue that society does not
have an interest in preventing the molestation of children by the child's
family members.' Sexual abuse can have devastating psychological conse-
quences for the abused child." Insofar as society strives to lessen the harm
caused to innocent individuals, measures designed to prevent parental sexual
abuse of children and to relieve the adverse mental health effects of incest
clearly promote the public interest.' Psychotherapists who utilize recov-
ered-memory therapy thus have a socially desirable goal - helping incest
victims recover from the psychologically adverse effects of sexual abuse.
Therefore, to the extent that recovered-memory therapists help their pa-
tients, these psychotherapists act in the public interest.
But, while recovered-memory therapists admittedly engage in a com-
mendable endeavor, two factors undermine the force of this conclusion.
First, most physicians who treat patients engage in socially useful behav-
ior." Yet, as discussed earlier, courts have extended physician liability
beyond the physician-patient relationship. 4 Thus, the fact that an activity
involves medical treatment is not by itself determinative. Second, unlike
the physicians in the negligent misdiagnosis cases, recovered-memory thera-
pists in Ramona-type cases generally do not discover current child abuse and
therefore do not prevent further incest. 5 As the name "recovered-memory
therapy" implies, the psychotherapist attempts to recover patient memories
250. See Vineyard v. Kraft, 828 S.W.2d 248, 253 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (noting growing
public awareness of parental sexual abuse of children).
251. See Brian D. Gallagher, Note, Damages, Duress, and the Discovery Rules: The
Statutory Right of Recovery for Victims of Childhood Sexual Abuse, 17 SETON HALL LEGIS. J.
505, 521-523 (1993) (describing unique injurious effects of child sexual abuse). As Gallagher
notes, the victim of child sexual abuse "may sustain psychological damage far more severe
than any physical injury." Id. at 521.
252. Cf. In re Welfare of J.A., 417 N.W.2d 696, 698 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (recogniz-
ing that child abuse prevention is important public policy interest).
253. C. Leonard M. Fleck, Just Health Care Rationing: A Democratic Decisionmaking
Approach, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1597, 1602 (1992) (claiming that access to health care is in
public interest).
254. See supra notes 87-91, 117-68, 177-83, 188-91, 196-200 and accompanying text
(outlining cases in which courts have held physicians liable to nonpatients).
255. See Bird v. W.C.W., 868 S.W.2d 767, 769 (Tex. 1994) (stressing importance of
eradicating sexual abuse in determining that mental health professional had no duty to
nonpatient).
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of past abuse."56 Unless the alleged abuser currently is molesting another
young family member, the psychotherapist will not prevent further incest.
Thus, the therapist does not further the social interest that those courts that
have refused to allow nonpatient suits for negligent misdiagnosis cited as
of overriding importance.
Even conceding that recovered-memory therapy could further important
public interests does not answer the question of whether recovered-memory
therapy does advance these social goals. Critics of recovered-memory
therapy claim that an erroneous conception of how memory actually works
underlies recovered-memory therapy. 7 Naysayers also warn that the tech-
niques that recovered-memory therapists use, coupled with the mind's sug-
gestibility, can implant false memories into patient's minds"8 Furthermore,
even the American Psychiatric Association has issued warnings about the
possible creation of false memories through repeated questioning." There-
fore, although recovered-memory therapy theoretically may advance the
public interest, serious doubts remain as to the extent that recovered-mem-
ory therapy theoretically actually does advance those interests.
Moreover, less dangerous methods may be available to the psychothera-
pist. While corroboration does not seem to be a sufficient alternative be-
cause of inadequate reporting,"c the careful, reasonable application of
recovered-memory therapy is a viable option.261 Plaintiffs in Ramona-type
cases are not asking courts to hold psychotherapists responsible for attempt-
ing to uncover memories, but for negligently utilizing recovered-memory
therapy.262 Although the standard of conduct by which courts should judge
256. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (describing goal of recovered-memory
therapy).
257. Supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text (noting belief of some that
recovered-memory therapy relies on outdated conception of memory functioning).
258. Supra notes 65, 67 and accompanying text (noting that patient suggestibility can
lead to false memories).
259. See Sandra G. Boodman, The Professional Debate Over an Emotionat Issue, WASH.
POST, Apr. 12, 1994, (Health), at 13, 14 (noting that American Psychiatric Association issued
five-page policy statement warning that repeated questioning may implant memories).
260. Cf. Steven F. Shatz et al., The Strip Search of Children and the Fourth Amendment,
26 U.S.F. L. REv. 1, 32 (1991) (noting estimate that four out of five cases of child abuse go
unreported).
261. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 113, § 291 (defining when act
is negligent). According to the American Law Institute, an act is unreasonable "if the risk
is of such magnitude as to outweigh what the law regards as the utility of the act or of the
particular manner in which it is done." Id. (emphasis added).
262. Cf. Diane Curtis, "Memories" Trial in Hands of Jurors, S.F. CHRON., May 12,
1994, at A17 (noting that Ramona was suing therapists for negligence).
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recovered-memory therapists is not the subject of this Note, one can imagine
conduct that clearly falls short of reasonable care. 63
In summary, the social utility of the recovered-memory therapist's
conduct does not have overwhelming force. First, although the psychothera-
pist seeks to advance the important public interest of dealing with parental
sexual abuse of children, in most cases the psychotherapist will only address
past wrongs and not prevent new ones." Second, even assuming the social
utility of the recovered-memory therapist's conduct, the likelihood of fur-
thering that societal interest is speculative, given the inherent danger of
implanting memories.26 Finally, imposing a duty on psychotherapists in
Ramona-type cases would not preclude psychotherapists from attempting
to uncover instances of sexual abuse; the duty would hold liable only those
recovered-memory therapists who take the more dangerous route of sugges-
tive questioning. 6
b. The Magnitude of the Burden on the Psychotherapist
to Avoid the Harm
In determining the magnitude of the burden on the psychotherapist to
avoid injuring the nonpatient, a court usually looks at two things. First, the
court analyzes the defendant's difficulty in abiding by the imposed duty.267
Courts typically have recognized a distinction between those duties that
require affirmative action (positive duties)268 and those duties that merely
require that the defendant refrain from taking certain action (negative du-
ties). 9 Courts more commonly impose liability in cases in which the duty
263. Cf. Kanovitz, supra note 64, at 1187-90 (describing arguably negligent recov-
ered-memory therapy).
264. See supra notes 255-56 and accompanying text (noting that recovered-memory
therapists usually will not prevent future sexual abuse).
265. Supra notes 257-59 and accompanying text (noting that it is at least somewhat
speculative whether recovered-memory therapists actually engage in socially useful behavior).
266. Supra notes 261-63 and accompanying text (noting that duty of care would preclude
only negligent utilization of recovered-memory therapy).
267. C f Montoya v. Bebensee, 761 P.2d285, 288-89 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that
one factor in favor of imposing duty of care on therapists to nonpatients is fact that burden
of due care placed upon therapists in making opinion about whether person sexually abused
child is no greater than duty that most professionals must meet).
268. See A. D. Woozley, A Duty to Rescue: Some Thoughts on Criminal Liability, 69
VA. L. REV. 1273, 1294 (1983) (defining "positive duty" as duty to aid). Woozley takes
"duty to aid to be a duty to make (if you can) things better for the other party than they would
be if you had not been there." Id.
269. See id. (defining "negative duty" as duty not to harm). Woozley takes "a duty not
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requires nonaction.2 z0 In Ramona-type cases, the duty will require only that
the psychotherapist abstain from engaging in certain risky conduct, such as
aggressive, suggestive questioning.27 Thus, courts can more easily justify
this duty to the nonpatient. Beyond the physical vigor required in carrying
out the duty, courts also examine the financial burden that the duty places on
the defendant. 2' If a court extends psychotherapist liability to Ramona-type
cases, the psychotherapist's malpractice insurance premiums will increase.
Malpractice insurance is already quite expensive. 4 Thus, imposing a duty
of reasonable care to nonpatients on recovered-memory therapists does im-
pose monetary costs on psychotherapists.
Second, courts consider the defendant's ability to bear or distribute the
costs imposed by the duty as a factor weighing in favor of imposing a duty. 5
Psychotherapists, in the operation of their practices, incur duty costs, such
as malpractice insurance premiums. 6 A psychotherapist can distribute the
to harm to be a duty not to make things (if you can) worse for the other party than if you had
not been there." Id.
270. See Shlomo Twerski, Note, Affirmative Duty After Tarasoff, 11 HoFsTRA L. REV.
1013, 1015-16 (1983) (describing decisions that show courts' historic commitment to keep
free of liability one's failure to act). Courts may be reluctant to impose affirmative duties
because affirmative duties restrict liberty more than negative duties and because breaching
affirmative duties carries a lesser certainty of harm than breaching negative duties. See
Dinah Shelton, The Duty to Assist Famine Victims, 70 IowA L. REv. 1309, 1317 (1985)
(listing two traditional objections to positive legal duties). Shelton describes the objections
to affirmative legal duties as "breaching negative duties carries a greater certainty of harm
than breaching positive obligations" and "positive duties restrict liberty more than negative
duties." Id.
271. Cf. Kanovitz, supra note 64, at 1187-90 (1992) (outlining type of conduct that
psychotherapist arguably should avoid).
272. Cf. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976) (stating
that courts considering whether to impose duty on defendant should consider "the availabil-
ity, cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved").
273. Cf. Gary W. Kuc, Comment, Practice Parameters as a Shield Against Physician
Liability, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 439, 450 (1994) (noting that increasing
number of lawsuits filed has contributed to matching increases in medical malpractice
insurance premiums).
274. See Nancy M. Simone, Medical Malpractice Litigation: A Comparative Analysis
of United States and Great Britain, 12 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 577, 581 (1989) (noting
that medical malpractice insurance became increasingly unavailable and expensive in
1970s).
275. Supra note 222 and accompanying text (noting that courts consider whether
defendant can distribute duty costs).
276. See Kuc, supra note 273, at 450 (noting that malpractice litigation leads to
additional costs for physicians in terms of malpractice insurance premiums).
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damage costs among his or her patients by raising fees.2' Thus, because the
psychotherapist would not have to bear personally the costs of compliance
with the duty, the magnitude of the burden on the defendant is slight.
c. The Societal Consequences of Imposing a Duty
on the Psychotherapist
Before imposing a duty of reasonable care on an actor, courts consider
the consequences that the court's decision will have on society." Three
consequences seem particularly relevant to recovered-memory therapy. First,
psychotherapists likely will raise their fees or stop providing recovered-mem-
ory therapy. 9 Second, society possibly will identify fewer child molest-
ers.28 Third, further advances in psychotherapy probably will occur more
slowly, if at all."8 While imposing duties on recovered-memory therapists
to nonpatient family members in Ramona-type cases could have adverse
effects, certain factors offset these negative consequences.
First, imposing duties on psychotherapists to nonpatient family members
in Ramona-type cases might lead to higher health care costs and the unavail-
ability of certain treatments.' These are serious consequences, especially
given society's interest in access to affordable health care. 3 Thus, Ramona-
type liability could have serious adverse consequences for society.
Second, society concededly might discover fewer child molesters. How-
ever, it is doubtful that this ignorance precludes society from preventing
277. See id. at 450-51 (recognizing that physicians facing malpractice costs sometimes
charge their patients higher fees).
278. Supra notes 218, 223 and accompanying text (noting how courts consider societal
consequences of imposing duty on defendant).
279. See Kuc, supra note 273, at 450-51 (stating that physicians facing additional
malpractice costs either charge patients higher fees or stop providing high-risk services
completely).
280. Cf. Bird v. W.C.W., 868 S.W.2d 767, 769 (Tex. 1994) (stating importance of
discovering sexual abuse in refusing to impose duty on mental health professional to non-
patient).
281. Cf. supra note 52 and accompanying text (noting claim of many doctors that threat
of malpractice suits limits medical research).
282. Supra note 279 and accompanying text (noting that imposing duty on psychothera-
pists might cause psychotherapists to raise fees or to stop providing recovered-memory
therapy).
283. See Theodore R. LeBlang, Medical Malpractice and Physician Accountability:
Trends in the Courts and Legislative Responses, 3 ANNALS HEALTH L. 105, 121 (1994)
(noting public interest in access to affordable health care).
799
53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 763 (1996)
continuing molestation. In Ramona-type cases, the children are no longer
in danger from their abusive parents.' Thus, identification serves retribu-
tive, but not deterrent, goals.
Third, recovered-memory advocates argue that psychotherapy may make
fewer advances.m These advocates claim that psychotherapists, if open to
nonpatient suits, will be less likely to utilize innovative psychotherapeutic
techniques.' However, the imposition of such duties will force psychothera-
pists to spend more time studying the validity of these methods before putting
them into practice, thus deterring hasty, and possibly negligent, conduct.W
So, although psychotherapy might advance more slowly, psychotherapy will
be less likely to harm third parties. Thus, the imposition of a duty actually
creates a positive result for society. Therefore, while requiring recovered-
memory therapists to exercise due care with regard to nonpatient family mem-
bers could have serious consequences for society, the goal of deterring harm
to family relationships balances against those adverse effects.
IV. Conclusion
Three factors make Ramona v. Isabella a controversial case.' First,
from the public's viewpoint, incest is a major concern. 9 Second, from the
medical community's viewpoint, recovered-memory therapy is a controversial
psychotherapeutic technique.2' Third, from the legal community's view-
point, courts rarely allow nonpatient suits against physicians. 91 Policy con-
cerns underlie Ramona's controversy, and courts must weigh policy consider-
ations to determine the propriety of Ramona-type suits. 29
284. See supra notes 255-56 and accompanying text (recognizing that, in most cases,
recovered-memory therapy occurs long after abuse has subsided).
285. Cf. supra note 52 and accompanying text (stating doctors' claim that threat of
malpractice suits limits medical research).
286. Cf. id. (same).
287. Cf. Sharon E. Conaway, Comment, The Continuing Search for Solutions to the
Drinking Driver Tragedy and the Problem of Social Host Liability, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 403,
419 (1988) (noting that one purpose of negligence liability is deterrence of tortfeasors).
288. See supra notes 30-57, 85-92 and accompanying text (describing Ramona case and
why case was legally groundbreaking).
289. See supra note 186 and accompanying text (noting society's need to have doctors
discover incest without fear of liability).
290. See supra notes 58-84 and accompanying text (describing recovered-memory ther-
apy and underlying medical controversy).
291. See supra notes 85-92 and accompanying text (describing why Ramona is legally
controversial).
292. Cf. supra notes 201-87 and accompanying text (outlining and weighing policy
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More specifically, courts deciding whether to extend physician liability
to nonpatients weigh the magnitude of the nonpatient's harm against the social
utility of the physician's conduct.293 Thus, courts should impose new duties
on psychotherapists in Ramona-type cases only if the court finds that the
magnitude of the nonpatient family member's harm outweighs the social
utility of negligent recovered-memory therapy.' 9 Based upon this standard,
courts should allow Ramona-type suits.
First, the magnitude of the nonpatient family members' harm warrants
extending psychotherapist liability. Not only is the nonpatient's injury clearly
foreseeable,295 but courts can determine with a high degree of certainty that
the nonpatient actually suffered harm.296 Furthermore, negligent recovered-
memory therapy involves a great risk to important social interests, such as
family relationships. 2' And false, implanted memories harm others besides
the alleged abuser." Thus, the magnitude of the nonpatient's harm warrants
extending psychotherapist liability.
Second, while preventing child abuse and relieving its adverse psycho-
logical effects clearly further the public interest,' certain factors undermine
the relative stiength of negligent recovered-memory therapy's social utility.'
Because of the uncertain validity of recovered-memory therapy, it is unclear
when the technique uncovers true cases of incest, especially when the psycho-
therapist uses suggestive questioning.3 Furthermore, imposing a duty of
care on recovered-memory therapists would be a relatively small burden
because the duty would require no affirmative action.m Finally, extending
psychotherapist liability could have positive social consequences: When
considerations relevant to Ramona-type cases).
293. Supra notes 201-03 and accompanying text (noting how courts weigh magnitude of
nonpatient's harm and social utility of physician's conduct).
294. See supra note 202 and accompanying text (recognizing that courts impose duty if
harm outweighs utility).
295. Supra notes 224-34 and accompanying text (discussing foreseeability of harm).
296. See supra notes 235-39 and accompanying text (discussing certainty of harm).
297. See supra notes 240-47 and accompanying text (examining risk involved).
298. See supra notes 248-49 and accompanying text (discussing quantitative harm).
299. See supra notes 250-52 and accompanying text (noting that recovered-memory
therapists attempt to advance socially desirable goal).
300. See supra notes 253-56 and accompanying text (discussing factors that undermine
relative strength of negligent recovered-memory therapy's social utility).
301. See supra notes 257-59 and accompanying text (discussing theoretical problems with
recovered-memory therapy).
302. See supra notes 267-77 and accompanying text (examining magnitude of burden on
psychotherapist to avoid harm).
53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 763 (1996)
psychotherapy does advance new techniques, these therapies will be less
likely to harm innocent third parties. 3 Given the preceding policy conclu-
sions, the magnitude of the nonpatient family members' harm outweighs the
social utility of the recovered-memory therapist's conduct. Therefore, courts
should extend psychotherapist liability in Ramona type cases.
303. See supra note 287 and accompanying text (noting that imposing duty on recov-
ered-memory therapists may force therapists to spend more time on research of new tech-
niques before implementation).
